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SENTENCING IN TAX CASES AFTER BOOKER: STRIKING THE
RIGHT BALANCE BETWEEN UNIFORMITY AND DISCRETION
SCOTT A. SCHUMACHER*
I. INTRODUCTION
IT has been nearly ten years since the Supreme Court’s seminal decisionin United States v. Booker,1 in which the Court invalidated the mandatory
application of the United States Sentencing Guidelines.2  In the cases that
followed, the Court addressed subsidiary issues regarding the application
of the Guidelines and the scope of appellate review.3  However, despite—
or perhaps because of—these opinions, there is little consensus regarding
the status and extent of appellate review, as well as the discretion afforded
to sentencing courts.4  More troubling, what consensus there is seems to
permit judges to impose any sentence they wish, as long as the appropriate
sentencing procedures are followed.5  As a result, we are in danger of re-
turning to “the ‘shameful’ lack of parity, which the Guidelines sought to
remedy.”6
The Sentencing Reform Act and the Sentencing Guidelines were de-
signed to reduce disparity in sentencing and to reign in what one com-
mentator described as a “lawless system.”7  However, the Guidelines, as
ultimately conceived, drastically limited the sentencing judge’s ability to
impose a sentence that was appropriate for the conduct and culpability of
* Professor of Law, Director Graduate Program in Taxation, University of
Washington School of Law, Seattle.  The author would like to thank Professors
Keith Fogg and Leslie Book, and the participants of the Norman J. Shachoy
Symposium at Villanova University School of Law, as well as Sherry Leyson, Cheryl
Nyberg, and the library staff of the University of Washington School of Law’s
Gallagher Law Library for their invaluable research assistance.
1. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
2. Id. at 233.
3. See, e.g., Spears v. United States, 555 U.S. 261 (2009); Kimbrough v. United
States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007); Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007); Rita v. United
States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007).
4. See, e.g., United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc);
United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc); United States v.
Cavera, 550 F.3d 180 (2d Cir. 2008) (en banc).
5. See, e.g., Tomko, 562 F.3d at 568 (“[I]f the district court’s sentence is proce-
durally sound, we will affirm it unless no reasonable sentencing court would have
imposed the same sentence on that particular defendant for the reasons the dis-
trict court provided.”).
6. Cavera, 550 F.3d at 224 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (citing S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 65 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182,
3248).
7. See MARVIN FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 8 (1973)
(describing judges’ sentencing power as “effectively subject to no law at all”).
(563)
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the defendant, creating a different kind of sentencing disparity.8  The cur-
rent, post-Booker system provides more guidance than the pre-Guidelines
system, but permits sentencing judges to disregard the Guidelines and de-
velop their own sentencing policies.9  As a result, rather than having a
system that allows for sentences to be tailored to individual defendants, the
current system allows sentences to be imposed based on the penal philoso-
phy of individual judges.10 This will inevitably lead to unwarranted sentenc-
ing disparity.11  This Article traces the recent history of criminal
sentencing and argues for a better system that allows for both guidance to
sentencing judges and appropriately individualized sentences.  John Rawls
and H. L. A. Hart, in their seminal works on punishment, posited that
there are two questions that must be asked, each at different stages of the
sentencing proceeding.12  The first question is why do we punish offend-
ers?  To that question, Rawls and Hart answer that we punish to deter
others from committing crimes and to protect other members of society.13
The second question is why do we punish this particular person?  The an-
swer to that question is because that person did something wrong and
deserves to be punished.14  They advocate that the first question is rele-
vant to the legislative function, while the second is relevant to the judicial
function at the time of sentencing an offender.15
I advocate a sentencing regime where the Sentencing Guidelines pro-
vide the starting point for each sentence and are based on the deterrent
policies that are the answer to Rawls and Hart’s first question.  In tax cases,
that means that the baseline Guidelines sentence should continue to focus
on tax loss and general deterrence.16  However, when it comes to sentenc-
ing the particular offender, judges should be instructed to sentence the
offender based upon the offender’s culpability and personal circum-
stances.  Appellate review of these sentences should require that judges
follow the initial Guidelines but allow variance from the Guidelines range
if it is properly based on the individual characteristics of the defendant.  In
this way, sentences will be uniform where it is relevant and will have dispar-
ity that is warranted.
Part II of this Article will detail the sentencing procedures prior to the
Sentencing Guidelines and the problems with that regime.  In Part III, this
8. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Assessing the Federal Sentencing Process: The Problem
is Uniformity, Not Disparity, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 833, 851–70 (1992).
9. See United States v. Higdon, 531 F.3d 561, 562 (7th Cir. 2008).
10. See id.
11. See infra notes 197–206 and accompanying text.
12. See H. L. A. Hart., Prolegonmenon to the Principles of Punishment, in PHILOSO-
PHY OF PUNISHMENT (Robert M. Baird & Stuart Rosenbaum eds., 1988); John Rawls,
Two Concepts of Rules, in PHILOSOPHY OF PUNISHMENT 37 (Robert M. Baird & Stuart
Rosenbaum eds., 1988).
13. See Rawls, supra note 12, at 38–39; see also Hart, supra note 12, at 19–20.
14. See Rawls, supra note 12, at 38–39; see also Hart, supra note 12, at 19–20.
15. See Rawls, supra note 12, at 38–39; see also Hart, supra note 12, at 19–20.
16. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2T1.1 (2012).
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Article will describe the Sentencing Reform Act, the Guidelines, and the
issues that arose as a result of the Guidelines.  Part IV will discuss Booker
and its progeny, and it will describe the semi-chaotic current state of sen-
tencing law.  Finally, in Part V, I will outline what I view is a better system
that preserves sentencing discretion without rendering the system standar-
dless and lawless.  My recommendation, although equally applicable to
any federal sentence, will be examined through the lens of tax sentencing.
II. SENTENCING PRIOR TO THE GUIDELINES
Prior to the Sentencing Reform Act and the Sentencing Guidelines,
federal judges had nearly unfettered discretion in imposing criminal
sentences.17  As long as the sentence was within the statutory range, and
not based upon a constitutionally impermissible basis, the sentence would
not be disturbed.18  Moreover, appeals of sentences were almost non-exis-
tent.19  Thus, a convicted defendant’s sentence was based, at least ini-
tially,20 on the predilections, whims, and philosophy of the sentencing
judge.21  This was not always the case.
A. A Very Brief History of Pre-Guidelines Sentencing
Prior to the middle of the nineteenth century, judges had very little
discretion in sentencing matters.  In the early development of the com-
mon law, sentences were imposed to keep what was at times a very fragile
peace, and sentences took the place of the individual’s “quest for ven-
geance.”22  Thus, retribution was the prevailing theory of punishment,
and justice being a “substitute for vengeance, was brutal.”23  Indeed, most
sentences for felonies in the early common law carried the death pen-
alty.24  In addition, all felonies carried with them the penalties of “forfei-
ture of goods and attainder,” meaning that the felon’s heirs could not
17. See FRANKEL, supra note 7, at 5.
18. See id. at 5–6 (describing range of permissible judicial discretion in
sentencing).
19. See generally ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENCES (1968) [hereinafter
STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENCES].
20. Under the sentencing rules prior to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,
defendants received indeterminate sentences.  Prior to the Act, the amount of
time actually served would depend upon the decision of the Parole Board.  For a
discussion of the sentencing rules prior to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 and
the use of the Parole Board’s discretion, see infra notes 33–39 and accompanying
text.
21. See FRANKEL, supra note 7, at 8.
22. ROSCOE POUND, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 92, 111 (1930).
23. Id. at 92.
24. See generally 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES.  Even when the death
penalty was relaxed, the sentences were nevertheless shocking.  For misdemeanors,
the usual penalty was pillory and flogging; for petty larceny, ears were cut off; and
for other crimes, branding was imposed. See POUND, supra note 22, at 103.
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succeed to his property or title.25  When those draconian penalties were
lessened, crimes nevertheless carried a fixed penalty.26  The judge would
supervise the trial or guilty plea, and once guilt was determined, the sen-
tence would follow automatically.27
In the middle of the nineteenth century, penal theories other than
retribution began to influence policy makers.28  As a result, uniform
sentences began to change, and judges were given the discretion to deter-
mine the sentence to be imposed.29  This discretion reached its zenith, at
least at the federal level, beginning in the 1910s, when rehabilitation be-
came the predominate theory of punishment, and Congress established
indeterminate sentencing.30  It was believed that the propensity to commit
a criminal act was a “sickness,” akin to mental illness, that could be “cured”
through proper rehabilitation.31  As a result, a sentence imposed on a per-
son convicted of a crime should have been no longer than was necessary to
cure or rehabilitate the person.32  It was, of course, impossible to know at
the time of sentencing exactly how long it would take for the convict to be
cured and ready to re-enter society.  Thus, parole boards were established
to make this post-hoc diagnosis.33  Under this system, judges could impose
any sentence within the statutory range, with the sentence based upon the
level of culpability or sickness of the defendant.  Whether the defendant
served all or even a major portion of that sentence was determined after
the fact by the parole board.  As a result, defendants would not know, and
indeed could not know, the length of time they would spend in prison at
the time of their sentencing.
The unfettered discretion of sentencing judges was blessed by the Su-
preme Court in Williams v. New York.34  In Williams, the defendant was con-
victed of murder, and the jury recommended a punishment of life
imprisonment.  However, relying, in part, on evidence and facts that were
not submitted to the jury at trial, the judge found that the defendant had
committed other serious crimes and was a “menace to society.”35  The
25. POUND, supra note 22, at 103.
26. See Note, Procedural Due Process at Judicial Sentencing for Felony, 81 HARV. L.
REV. 821, 821–22 (1968).
27. See id. at 822.
28. See Michele Pifferi, Individualization of Punishment and the Rule of Law: Re-
shaping Legality in the United States and Europe Between the 19th and the 20th Century, 52
AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 325, 333–34 (2012).
29. See Procedural Due Process at Judicial Sentencing for Felony, supra note 26, at
822.
30. Peter B. Hoffman, History of the Federal Parole System: Part 1 (1910-1972),
FED. PROBATION, Sept. 1997, at 25–27.
31. See Alfred Blumstein, American Prisons in a Time of Crisis, 4 LAW, SOC’Y &
POL’Y 13, 13–14 (Lynne Goodstein & Doris Layton MacKenzie eds., 1989); Michael
Vitiello, Reconsidering Rehabilitation, 65 TUL. L. REV. 1011, 1016 (1991).
32. See Vitiello, supra note 31, at 1016.
33. See FRANKEL, supra note 7, at 89.
34. 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
35. Id. at 244.
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judge sentenced the defendant to death.  The defendant appealed, argu-
ing that his due process rights were violated when the judge sentenced
him by relying on facts that were not presented in court and were pro-
vided by persons the defendant was not permitted to cross-examine or
confront.  The Supreme Court rejected this challenge and held that there
are different evidentiary standards for trial and for sentencing.36  Under
the then-prevailing indeterminate sentencing system, discretion was essen-
tial to making the appropriately individualized sentence, both at the time
of sentencing and in later proceedings before parole boards.37  Moreover,
the Court asserted that the new, “modern” indeterminate sentencing re-
gime usually resulted in a lesser sentence than under the prior system
where judges simply imposed the full sentence for that crime.  Judicial
discretion and fact-finding served to benefit offenders and “[i]n general,
these modern changes have not resulted in making the lot of offenders
harder.”38  Thus, sentencing judges were not limited to in-court evidence
subject to the normal trial rules.  Such a system “would hinder if not pre-
clude all courts—state and federal—from making progressive efforts to
improve the administration of criminal justice.”39
B. Too Much Discretion: A Lawless System
The system of unfettered judicial discretion and indeterminate sen-
tencing came under focused attack in the 1960s and 1970s.40  Following
the work of the American Law Institute’s Model Penal Code and the Na-
tional Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws (Brown Commis-
sion), Congress began to reform the federal criminal laws into a more
rational and fair classification of crimes.41  While neither the Model Penal
Code nor the Brown Commission specifically addressed sentencing, those
efforts nevertheless paved the way for comprehensive sentencing
reform.42
36. See id. at 248–49.
37. See id. at 249.
38. Id.  Of course, the discretion that the sentencing judge exercised certainly
made the lot of Mr. Williams a lot harder.  Given that Williams was sentenced to
death, the callousness of the Court’s statement is breathtaking.
39. Id. at 251.
40. See John J. Parker et al., Report to the Judicial Conference of the Committee on
Punishment for Crime, FED. PROBATION, July–Sept. 1942, at 41 (raising problems with
sentencing disparity and disparate treatment of offenders).
41. See Kenneth R. Feinberg, Federal Criminal Sentencing Reform: Congress and the
United States Sentencing Commission, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 291, 294 (1993).
42. See id.
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The source of the most important, and influential,43 attack came
from an unlikely source—a United States District Court judge.44  In Crimi-
nal Sentences: Law Without Order, Judge Marvin E. Frankel set forth, in stark
and vivid detail, the problems with the then-existing sentencing regime.
First, judges could impose any sentence within the statutory limit.  Given
the often cavernous range of federal sentences,45 sentencing judges were
essentially not subject to any law at all.46  Frankel noted the maxim that
the United States is a nation of laws, not men.  Yet, in the realm of sen-
tencing, the vast discretion afforded judges created a “regime of such arbi-
trary fiat [that] would be intolerable in a supposedly free society, to say
nothing of being invalid under our due-process clause.”47
Frankel also noted that in the effort to individualize sentences, the
system is contrary to fundamental concepts of “equality, objectivity, and
consistency in the law.”48  Frankel acknowledged that individualized
sentences were a good thing, but asserted that these sentences should be
made to turn on objective criteria and “not left for [the] determination in
the wide-open, uncharted, standardless discretion of the judge . . . .”49
Thus, the most significant failure of the system was not just the unbridled
discretion given to judges.  Rather, it was that this discretion was conferred
without any guidance or standards, save maximum penalties.  Some judges
believed that certain crimes called for the maximum penalty by default,
unless the defendant’s case warranted mercy, while another judge—per-
haps in the same courthouse—believed that the same crimes should re-
ceive no jail time, unless they were more serious than normal.50
43. Judge Frankel’s book was read by Senator Edward Kennedy, who was chair
of the Senate Judiciary Committee.  Kennedy and others on the Judiciary Commit-
tee sought to implement the reforms urged by Frankel. See Feinberg, supra note
41, at 295.  Senator Kennedy, in turn, became an influential voice in the sentenc-
ing reform movement, writing extensively on the subject. See, e.g., Edward M. Ken-
nedy, Commentary—The Federal Criminal Code Reform Act and New Sentencing
Alternatives, 82 W. VA. L. REV. 423 (1980); Edward M. Kennedy, Criminal Sentencing:
A Game of Chance, 60 JUDICATURE 208 (1976); Edward M. Kennedy, Equal Justice and
the Problem of Access, 11 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 485 (1978); Edward M. Kennedy, Federal
Criminal Code: An Overview, 47 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 451 (1979); Edward M. Ken-
nedy, Introduction to Symposium on Sentencing, Part I, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1 (1978);
Edward M. Kennedy, Reforming the Federal Criminal Code: A Congressional Response, 8
N.C. CENT. L. REV. 1 (1976); Edward M. Kennedy, Toward a New System of Criminal
Sentencing: Law with Order, AM. CRIM. L. REV. Spring 1979, at 353.
44. I say unlikely because the ultimate indictment of the system by Judge
Frankel is that he and his fellow judges have too much discretion and power.  It is
unlikely that the powerful will relinquish power.
45. For example, mail fraud has a statutory maximum penalty of twenty years.
See 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012).  Thus, if convicted, a defendant could face anywhere
from probation to twenty years in prison.
46. See FRANKEL, supra note 7, at 8.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 10.
49. Id. at 11.
50. See id. at 21.
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Accordingly, “individualized sentencing” came to mean not that the sen-
tence was based on the unique aspects of the defendant’s crime and per-
sonal history.  Instead, it meant the individual predilections and
prejudices of the judge.51
Another issue was the failure of indeterminate sentencing and the use
of rehabilitation as a justification for sentencing.52  Critics argued that the
authority of parole boards to release convicts when they were sufficiently
rehabilitated was too arbitrary and too shielded from public view, provid-
ing yet another avenue for unjust and unreviewable disparity.53
The sentencing procedures themselves added to the arbitrariness and
lawlessness.  “Individualized” sentences were based on information ob-
tained quickly and from over-worked probation officers.54  Sentencing
hearings were often short and pro forma,55 and the judge would usually
impose the sentence immediately.  Noting that judges generally ruminate
at length before rendering an opinion in comparatively trivial legal mat-
ters, Judge Frankel lamented the common practice that, when imposing a
criminal sentence that will subject a person to years of incarceration,
judges imposed their judgment instantly, and from the bench, without so
much as an explanation for the sentence imposed.  “The court renders no
‘opinion’ because it has not followed the rational steps required to create
one.”56
This failure to articulate reasons behind the sentence imposed fur-
ther underscored the arbitrariness and lawlessness of the sentencing sys-
tem.  Without articulating these reasons, the judge appears to act without
rules or the need to abide by them.57  The failure to articulate the bases
for a sentence also prevented any meaningful review of the sentence on
appeal.  This failure was not necessarily a problem, since sentences could
not be reviewed on appeal.  But the lack of appellate review merely com-
51. See id. (“[S]weeping penalty statutes allow sentences to be ‘individualized’
not so much in terms of defendants but mainly in terms of the wide spectrums of
character, bias, neurosis, and daily vary encountered among occupants of the trial
bench.”).
52. See Albert W. Alschuler, Sentencing Reform and Prosecutorial Power: A Critique
of Recent Proposals for “Fixed” and “Presumptive” Sentencing, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 550,
552 (1978) (discussing limitations of rehabilitation and inability to “probe a per-
son’s psyche and predict his future behavior”).
53. See Frank O. Bowman, III, Debacle: How the Supreme Court Has Mangled Amer-
ican Sentencing Law and How It Might Yet Be Mended, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 367, 375
(2010).
54. See FRANKEL, supra note 7, at 27.
55. See id. at 37.
56. Id. at 38.  This system also violated the maxim of Justice Frankfurter that
“justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.”  Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11,
14 (1954).
57. See FRANKEL supra note 7, at 39 (“The existence of a rationale may not
make the hurt pleasant or even just.  But the absence, or refusal, of reasons is a
hallmark of injustice.  So it requires no learning in law or political philosophy to
apprehend that the swift ukase, without explanation, is the tyrant’s way.  The des-
pot is not bound by rules.  He need not justify or account for what he does.”).
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pleted the tragedy: federal judges with life tenure could impose any sen-
tence within a statutory range, which commonly ranged from zero to
twenty years.58  The sentence was imposed with no common embarkation
point, no common route, and very little process, either due or otherwise.
These judges would then impose their sentence articulating no justifica-
tion or reasoning, all without concern of appellate review.  It is little won-
der that Frankel deemed this regime to be “arbitrary, cruel, and lawless.”59
III. THE RISE OF SENTENCING GUIDELINES
A. The Sentencing Reform Act and Congressional Intent
In response to the consensus that the current system of indeterminate
sentencing was not working, as well as the criticisms leveled by Judge Fran-
kel, the ABA,60 and others,61 Congress set about to revise the system.  Af-
ter several failed attempts,62 Congress finally passed the Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984 (the SRA).63
The SRA had three main objectives.  First, the principal goal of the
SRA was to alleviate the problem of sentencing disparity.64  The primary
vehicle for accomplishing this objective was the establishment of the Sen-
tencing Commission, which would be tasked with adopting sentencing
guidelines.65  The sentencing guidelines would be used as a basis for all
sentences imposed in the federal courts.66
Second, the SRA abolished parole and indeterminate sentencing.67
Convicted defendants would be sentenced to a definite term of imprison-
58. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012).
59. FRANKEL, supra note 7, at x.
60. See STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENCES, supra note
19.  The committee that drafted this recommendation included several federal
judges from district courts and the courts of appeals, as well as academics like
Professor Herbert Wechsler. See id. at vii–ix.
61. See supra note 43.
62. See, e.g., S. 2699, 94th Cong. (1975) (exhibiting Congress’s first attempt to
enact sentencing guidelines legislation).
63. Pub. L. No. 98–473, 98 Stat. 1976.
64. See Feinberg, supra note 41, at 295.  For example, a study showed that, in
the Second Circuit, punishments for identical cases could range from three to
twenty years of imprisonment. See S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 41 (1974) (citing
ANTHONY PARTRIDGE & WILLIAM ELDRIDGE, THE SECOND CIRCUIT SENTENCING
STUDY: A REPORT TO THE JUDGES 1–3 (1974)), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182,
3224.
65. See Feinberg, supra note 41, at 295–96.  There were three primary reasons
for having a commission, rather than Congress, draft the sentencing guidelines.
See id. at 297.  “First . . . Congress had neither the necessary time nor expertise” to
develop something as complex as sentencing guidelines. Id.  Second, there was a
concern that Congress, subject to the pressures of politics, would substantially in-
crease criminal sentences. See id.  Finally, there was a real question as to whether
congressionally-drafted guidelines could ever gain the full support of the Senate
and House of Representatives. See id.
66. See 28 U.S.C. § 994 (2012).
67. See Feinberg, supra note 41, at 296.
8
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ment or other punishment, and they would serve the entire sentence im-
posed by the judge.68  This effort would restore “truth in sentencing,” or
so the saying went.69  Related to this goal was the removal of rehabilitation
as a rationale for imposing a sentence.70  Relying on Frankel’s book, as
well as articles by Norval Morris and others,71 Congress concluded that the
well-intentioned, but ultimately misguided theory of rehabilitation as a
goal of imprisonment could no longer be justified.72
Finally, the SRA provided appeal rights to both defendants and the
government.73  “Appellate review of criminal sentences would provide the
mechanism for assuring that a sentence deemed too harsh or too lenient
would be remedied by an appellate court . . . .”74  In so doing, Congress
established that sentencing is a legal question, subject to review.75
The SRA is divided into two sets of provisions.  The first, in title 28,
sections 991 through 998 of the United States Code, sets forth the make-
up, powers, and duties of the Sentencing Commission.76  The most signifi-
cant provisions are in section 994, which requires the Commission to “pro-
mulgate and distribute to all courts of the United States” guidelines “for
use of a sentencing court in determining the sentence to be imposed in a
criminal case.”77  The second set, in title 18, sections 3551 through 3559 of
68. See id.  Offenders would, however, be eligible for a limited amount of
good-time credit, which was also drastically reduced over prior practice. See 18
U.S.C. § 3624(b) (Supp. IV 1986).
69. See Feinberg, supra note 41, at 296; see also S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 54, 56
(1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3237, 3239.
70. See Feinberg, supra note 41, at 297–98.
71. See NORVAL MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT (1974); see also FRANCIS
A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL: PENAL POLICY AND SOCIAL
PURPOSE (1981); DOUGLAS LIPTON ET AL., THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CORRECTIONAL
TREATMENT: A SURVEY OF TREATMENT EVALUATION STUDIES (1975); ANDREW VON
HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS (1976); Robert Martinson,
What Works?—Questions and Answers About Prison Reform, PUB. INTEREST, Spring
1974, at 22.
72. See Feinberg, supra note 41, at 297–98.
73. See id. at 296–97.
74. Id.
75. See id.
76. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 991–998 (2012).
77. Id. § 994.  The Commission was instructed to consider, inter alia:
(1) the grade of the offense;
(2) the circumstances under which the offense was committed which
mitigate or aggravate the seriousness of the offense;
(3) the nature and degree of the harm caused by the offense, including
whether it involved property, irreplaceable property, a person, a
number of persons, or a breach of public trust;
(4) the community view of the gravity of the offense;
(5) the public concern generated by the offense;
(6) the deterrent effect a particular sentence may have on the commis-
sion of the offense by others; and
(7) the current incidence of the offense in the community and in the
Nation as a whole.
Id.
9
Schumacher: Sentencing in Tax Cases After Booker: Striking the Right Balance
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2014
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\59-3\VLR305.txt unknown Seq: 10 14-AUG-14 14:56
572 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59: p. 563
the United States Code, sets forth the matters the judge should consider
when imposing a sentence.  Most significantly, section 3553(a) requires a
sentencing court to consider factors such as the nature and circumstances
of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant.78  Sec-
tion 3553(a) also sets forth the penal philosophies that a court should
consider, while notably not choosing between the varying, and often con-
flicting, philosophies.79  Judges are to consider:
[T]he need for the sentence imposed— to reflect the seriousness
of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just
punishment for the offense; to afford adequate deterrence to
criminal conduct; to protect the public from further crimes of
the defendant; and to provide the defendant with
needed . . . medical care, or other correctional treatment.80
The Sentencing Commission then undertook the herculean task of
writing comprehensive guidelines applicable to every criminal sentence.
Working from the time of its appointment on October 29, 1985, until
April 13, 1987, the Commission studied the sentences imposed in 10,000
actual cases.81  In developing the Guidelines, it attempted to follow what
was “typical past practice,” and imposed sentences that were the average of
78. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012).  The factors courts were required to con-
sider include:
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and
characteristics of the defendant;
(2) the need for the sentence imposed—
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for
the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational
training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the
most effective manner;
(3) the kinds of sentences available;
(4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established for—
(A) the applicable category of offense committed by the applicable
category of defendant as set forth in the guidelines
*  *  *
(5) any pertinent policy statement
(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defend-
ants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar con-
duct; and
(7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense.
Id.
79. See id. § 3553(a)(2).
80. Id.
81. See Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises
upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 7 (1988).  Actually, the Commission
analyzed 10,000 “augmented presentence reports” and the ensuing sentences. See
Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on the
Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681, 1743 (1992).  Thus, the Commission
drafted the Guidelines “in a partial vacuum, based primarily on prison sentence
10
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these prior sentences.82  However, the Commission did not even attempt
to fully differentiate between all offenders and offenses: “Punishment, as
the Commission came to see, is more of a blunderbuss than a laser beam.
An effort to make fine distinctions among criminal behaviors is like a stat-
istician running out crude statistics to ten decimal places, giving an im-
pression of precision that is false.”83
Using a detailed set of rules, tables, and adjustments that look at the
entire conduct of a convicted defendant, the Guidelines produce a numer-
ical score, or offense level, that translates into a range of months of impris-
onment.  For tax cases, most defendants are sentenced under section
2T1.1, and the sentence is based primarily on the amount of the tax
evaded, or “tax loss,”84 with adjustments for more sophisticated tax crimes
and for crimes that involve illegally-derived income.85
B. Problems with the Guidelines
Problems with the Guidelines were raised almost immediately after
their adoption.86  The criticisms leveled at the Guidelines were the result
of problems in both design and implementation.87  First, the system that
Congress created shifted to prosecutors the power that was formally in the
hands of sentencing judges.  Since the Guidelines were mandatory and
statistics and presentence reports, omitting consideration of the judgment and
thinking processes of the judges who produced those sentences.” Id. at 1744.
82. See Breyer, supra note 81, at 7.  Breyer noted, however, that in certain
cases, like white collar crime cases, the Commission increased the severity of
sentences imposed over prior practice. See id. at 7 n.49.  Indeed, under pre-Guide-
lines practice, roughly half of all tax defendants were sentenced to probation with-
out imprisonment.  This Guideline drastically curtailed the number of pure
probationary sentences.
83. Id. at 14.
84. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2T1.1(c)(1) (2012) (defining,
for many tax related penalties, tax loss as loss that would have resulted had offense
been successfully completed).
85. See JOHN A. TOWNSEND, LARRY A. CAMPAGNA, STEVE JOHNSON & SCOTT A.
SCHUMACHER, TAX CRIMES 301–08 (2008) (discussing application of Guidelines in
tax cases).
86. See, e.g., Dissenting View of Commissioner Paul H. Robinson on the Pro-
mulgation of Sentencing Guidelines by the U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, reprinted in
52 Fed. Reg. 18, 121 (May 13, 1987) (stating that final Sentencing Guidelines
adopted by Commission subverted its “ultimate goal” of drafting “a rational sen-
tencing system”); Paul H. Robinson, A Sentencing System for the 21st Century?, 66 TEX.
L. REV. 1, 4 (1987) (arguing that Guidelines adopted by Sentencing Commission
are “unlikely to bring rationality and uniformity to federal criminal sentencing”).
See generally, A. VON HIRSCH, PAST OR FUTURE CRIMES: DESERVEDNESS AND DANGER-
OUSNESS IN THE SENTENCING OF CRIMINALS (1985).
87. See Robinson, supra note 86, at 4.  There were other problems with the
Guidelines that were attributable neither to the SRA nor the work of the Commis-
sion.  Most notable were the continuing meddling of Congress in sentencing and
the repeated imposition of mandatory minimum sentences. See, e.g., Albert W. Al-
schuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea for Less Aggregation, 58 U. CHI. L.
REV. 901, 902 (1991).
11
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fact-driven, and since prosecutors are largely in control of sentencing
facts, prosecutors were often able to dictate the sentence that was im-
posed.88  More fundamentally, the Commission and the Guidelines are
“an expression of confidence in the administrative state: the idea that ‘ex-
perts’ insulated from politics are well suited (and sometimes best suited)
to make important public choices.”89  This belief in the omniscience or
omnicompetence of the Commission influenced the Commission’s work,
as well as sentencing judges’ reactions to the Guidelines.90
The belief in the primacy of administrative experts manifested itself
most fully when the Commission grabbed more power for itself and the
Guidelines, contrary to the statutory mandate set forth by Congress.91
The primary vehicle for preventing unjust results from a too-rigid applica-
tion of the Guidelines was the ability of the sentencing judge to depart
from the Guidelines.92  Under the SRA, the sentencing judge would first
consider the factors set forth in section 3553(a), including the nature and
circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the defen-
dant, and the purposes of sentencing.93  The judge was then required,
under section 3553(b), to determine the Guideline range and to decide
whether a sentence within the Guideline range was appropriate, or
whether a sentence outside the range was more appropriate because the
Guidelines failed to adequately reflect the section 3553(a) factors.94  Con-
gress never intended to eliminate judges’ “thoughtful imposition of indi-
vidualized sentences.”95  However, “the departure power never operated
as intended.”96  The Commission substantially curtailed the ability of sen-
tencing judges to depart, “except as explicitly authorized by the Commis-
sion itself.”97  The Commission then sought to identify nearly every fact
that could be relevant to the imposition of a criminal sentence and to
make a rule about whether the sentencing judge should consider it, and if
88. See Freed, supra note 81, at 1697–98 (“Guidelines are administrative hand-
cuffs that are applied to judges and no one else.  When an AUSA negotiates a
disposition by setting or reducing charges and identifying relevant facts, she effec-
tively restricts the judge’s sentencing range and, consequently, the ambit within
which upward and downward adjustments can make a difference. . . .  The judge’s
sentencing range is now tethered to the prosecutor’s choice of charges and facts,
unless the probation officer’s independent inquiry brings some facts into
question.”).
89. Frank O. Bowman, III, Mr. Madison Meets a Time Machine: The Political Sci-
ence of Federal Sentencing Reform, 58 STAN. L. REV. 235, 253 (2005).
90. See Freed, supra note 81, at 1699–1700.
91. Other problems include failing to provide for sentences of probation for
non-violent, first offenders. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 994(j) (2012).
92. See Amy Baron-Evans & Kate Stith, Booker Rules, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1631,
1641 (2012).
93. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012).
94. See id. § 3553(b).
95. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 52 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3235.
96. Baron-Evans & Stith, supra note 92, at 1641.
97. Id. at 1646.
12
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so, how.98  In the Commission’s view, it took into account all of the section
3553(a) factors in the Guidelines themselves, and thus would “prevent a
court from using it as grounds for departure.”99
Finally, as a result of the complexity of the Guidelines, and the lim-
ited ability to depart from them, the Guidelines system created its own
disparities.100  Some of the disparities resulted from the policy choices
made by the Commission.101  For example, the Guidelines have had a dis-
proportionate impact on black offenders.102  Moreover, offenders who dif-
fered significantly in their culpability, danger to the public, and risk of
recidivism were treated the same.103  Thus, the Sentencing Commission
did not create guidelines so much as it created judicial straightjackets.
Sentencing courts were not given guidance but were required to march in
lockstep to a mandated result, regardless of the wishes of the judge.104
C. Booker and the Demise of Mandatory Guidelines
The Guidelines were challenged on constitutional grounds almost im-
mediately after their adoption, and the Supreme Court appeared to settle
the constitutionality of the Guidelines in Mistretta v. United States.105  How-
ever, more constitutional challenges were to come.  Challenges to the fed-
eral Sentencing Guidelines were preceded by decisions involving state
98. See id. at 1648.
99. 52 Fed. Reg. 18,046, 18,050 (May 13, 1987).
100. See Albert W. Alschuler, Disparity: The Normative and Empirical Failure of the
Federal Guidelines, 58 STAN. L. REV. 85, 116 (2005).
101. See Mark Osler, Indirect Harms and Proportionality: The Upside-Down World of
Federal Sentencing, 74 MISS. L.J. 1, 1–6 (2004).  Osler discusses examples of the “up-
side-down” world of the Guidelines.  Examples of these disparities include: (1) “in
child pornography cases, the sentence for an individual who sends a computer
image of ‘virtual’ child pornography, made without the use of actual children,
would face a sentence twice as harsh as that allowed under the Guidelines for a
defendant who actually rapes a child;” (2) a person who manufactures a counter-
feit identity document is punished more harshly than the person who then uses
that same document to sneak into the country; and (3) “the punishment for pos-
sessing the weapon, which constitutes a threat, is often more severe than that for
actually using a gun in a violent crime.” Id. at 4 (footnote omitted).
102. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINE SENTENCING:
AN ASSESSMENT OF HOW WELL THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IS ACHIEVING
THE GOALS OF SENTENCING REFORM 131–34 (Nov. 2004); see also Anti-Drug Abuse
Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207.
103. Schulhofer, supra note 8, at 851–70.
104. Sentencing judges retained, as mentioned, a limited ability to depart.
Some judges were more skilled than others at avoiding what they believed to be
the harsh results of certain Guidelines sentences. See Jack B. Weinstein, A Trial
Judge’s Reflections on Departures from the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 5 FED. SENT’G
REP. 1 (1992).
105. 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (rejecting delegation doctrine and separation of
powers challenges to Sentencing Guidelines).
13
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sentencing guidelines.106  In Apprendi v. New Jersey,107 the defendant pled
guilty to various firearm offenses, which carried a maximum sentence of
ten years.  However, at sentencing, the judge found that the offense was
“motivated by racial bias,” and held that the hate crime enhancement ap-
plied, which authorized a twenty year sentence.108  The Supreme Court
reversed on Sixth Amendment grounds, holding that “[o]ther than the
fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”109  In Ring v. Arizona,110 the Supreme
Court applied Apprendi to an Arizona law that authorized the death pen-
alty if the judge found certain aggravating factors.  As in Apprendi, the
Court concluded that the defendant’s constitutional rights had been vio-
lated because the judge had imposed a sentence greater than the maxi-
mum that could have been imposed under state law without the
challenged factual finding.
In Blakely v. Washington,111 the Supreme Court extended the holdings
of Apprendi and Ring to Washington state’s sentencing guidelines regime.
The defendant in Blakely pled guilty to second-degree kidnaping, which
carried a maximum sentence of ten years.112  Under Washington’s sen-
tencing guidelines, the standard range for this crime was forty-nine to fifty-
three months.113  However, after hearing the victim’s description of the
kidnaping, the judge found that the defendant had acted with “deliberate
cruelty,” which was one of the statutorily enumerated grounds for depar-
ture in domestic-violence cases, and sentenced the defendant to ninety
months.114  Treating the standard guideline range as the “statutory maxi-
mum,” the Court held that the judge’s finding of “deliberate cruelty” vio-
lated the Sixth Amendment, as enumerated in Apprendi.115  The Court
came to this conclusion despite the fact that Blakely’s sentence of ninety
months was less than the ten year statutory maximum for the crime to
which he pled.116
106. See, e.g., Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004); Apprendi v. New
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
107. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
108. See id. at 471.
109. Id. at 490 (emphasis added).
110. 536 U.S. 584, 592–93 (2002).
111. 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
112. See id. at 299.
113. See id.
114. See id. at 300.
115. See id. at 303–05.
116. See id. at 303.
14
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Regardless of the merits of the decision,117 Blakely meant that an at-
tack on the federal Guidelines was inevitable.118  Indeed, within six
months, the Supreme Court decided United States v. Booker,119 a multi-part
decision with two majority opinions and four dissents that struck down the
federal Sentencing Guidelines.  The first part of the majority’s decision
dealt with the question of whether the Guidelines provisions allowing the
sentencing judge to base a sentence on conduct that was not found by a
jury violates the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.120  The Court held
that the mandatory application of the Sentencing Guidelines violated the
Sixth Amendment.121  Extending the curious logic in Blakely, the Court
held that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial “is implicated when-
ever a judge seeks to impose a sentence that is not solely based on ‘facts
reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant,’”122 and then
two paragraphs later stated, “when a trial judge exercises his discretion to
select a specific sentence within a defined range, the defendant has no
right to a jury determination of the facts that the judge deems rele-
vant.”123  Thus, the Court held that it is a violation of a defendant’s right
to a jury trial for the sentencing judge to base the sentence on facts not
found by the jury, unless the sentencing judge found those facts in the
exercise of his discretion.124  The Court believed, and stated “everyone
agrees,” that if the Guidelines were merely advisory, the Sixth Amendment
issue—and apparently the logical flaw as well—would be cured.125
In fashioning the appropriate remedy for the constitutional violation,
the so-called “remedial majority” held that the sentencing court should
still find the facts and must consider the Guidelines, but that the Guide-
lines were “effectively advisory” and permitted sentencing courts to tailor
117. Blakely has come under heavy criticism. See, e.g., Bowman, supra note 53,
at 418 (referring to Blakely decision as “silly” and “nearly incomprehensible”).  In-
deed, neither Apprendi nor the Sixth Amendment required the invalidation of the
Washington guidelines in Blakely or the federal Guidelines in Booker.  Neither the
Washington guidelines nor the federal Guidelines permitted the sentencing judge
to impose a sentence above the statutory range for the crimes for which the defen-
dant was found guilty by a jury.
118. Indeed, the second question asked during the Blakely oral argument was:
“Well, I assume that if your position were adopted it would invalidate the Federal
sentencing scheme that we have.”  Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, Blakely v.
Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) (No. 02-1632), available at 2004 WL 728362.
119. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
120. See id. at 245.
121. See id. at 226–27.
122. Id. at 232.
123. Id. at 233.
124. See id.  The Court does not explain, other than a citation to Williams, how
fact-finding as part of the exercise of discretion cures what it so clearly found to be
a Sixth Amendment violation.  I can see no logical or constitutional basis for this
distinction, and Williams is a very shaky foundation indeed on which to base a
revised sentencing regime.
125. See id.
15
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the appropriate punishment to each offender.126  The Court also excised
the portion of the SRA that called for de novo review and held that appel-
late courts were to review sentences for “unreasonableness.”127  However,
as others have noted, making the Guidelines merely advisory does not
change the “fundamental requirements of rational decisionmaking.”128
After Booker, just as under the mandatory Guidelines regime, judges
find facts that determine the sentence, many of which were never found by
a jury.  A sentencing judge is given a range of sentencing choices, and “a
sentence at the upper end of such a range cannot be rationally justified
unless the judge finds some fact in addition to the elements of the
crime.”129  In tax cases, juries do not make findings with respect to tax
loss, nor in drug cases do they make findings regarding the amount of
cocaine sold.  Indeed, the Guidelines still permit uncharged and acquitted
conduct to be considered by the judge at sentencing.  Thus, the remedy
articulated in Booker, just like the constitutional portion of the opinion, is
incompatible with the Sixth Amendment.130
Booker left many unanswered questions with which the lower courts
have had to wrestle,131 the thorniest being the nature and extent of appel-
late review.  Simply stated, if the Guidelines are not binding, and are only
advisory, can a sentence that is within statutory limits ever be a reversible
error?
Ultimately, the Supreme Court itself has had to jump back into the
fray, issuing no fewer than five opinions to clarify what it redundantly
claims to have made “pellucidly clear” in Booker.132  First, in Rita v. United
States,133 the Court held that when a district court sentences within the
range that the Sentencing Commission deems appropriate, the court of
appeals may presume that the sentence is reasonable.  Thus, following
Rita, the courts of appeals may apply a “presumption of reasonableness” to
a sentence that reflects a proper application of the Sentencing Guide-
lines.134  It did not require appellate courts to apply a presumption of rea-
sonableness, however, which will invariably lead to inconsistent appellate
review of sentences.135
126. See id. at 245.
127. See id. at 259–61.
128. Bowman, supra note 53, at 439.
129. Id.
130. See id. at 440–41.
131. In his dissent in Booker, Justice Scalia warned that the opinion would
“wreak havoc on federal district and appellate courts quite needlessly, and for the
indefinite future.” Booker, 543 U.S. at 313 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Given the tens of
thousands of cases that have cited Booker in the past four years, he appears to be
correct.
132. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46 (2007).
133. 551 U.S. 338 (2007).
134. See id. at 347.
135. For a more extensive discussion of this issue, see infra notes 264–65 and
accompanying text.
16
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Then in December 2007, the Court issued its decisions in Gall v.
United States136 and Kimbrough v. United States,137 which attempted to fur-
ther resolve the extent of appellate review of sentences imposed.  In Gall,
the defendant had been a member of a drug conspiracy while he was in
college.138  Several months after joining the conspiracy, Gall advised his
co-conspirators that he was withdrawing from the conspiracy, and thereaf-
ter he did not sell illegal drugs of any kind.139  He then graduated from
college, obtained gainful employment, and put his prior life of crime be-
hind him.  Several years later, he was indicted for his role in the drug
conspiracy and pleaded guilty.140  Under the Guidelines, Gall’s sentencing
range was thirty to thirty-seven months of imprisonment.  However, the
district court, noting both Gall’s brief participation in the conspiracy and
his rehabilitation, sentenced Gall to probation for a term of thirty-six
months.141  The court of appeals reversed, holding that “a sentence
outside of the Guidelines range must be supported by a justification that is
proportional to the extent of the difference between the advisory range
and the sentence imposed.”142  The Supreme Court reversed and rejected
the idea that a sentence outside the Guidelines range must be justified by
“extraordinary” circumstances.143
The Supreme Court then set up the procedure by which sentencing
courts should determine and impose sentences.  The sentencing court
should begin by calculating the applicable Guidelines range, noting that,
in an effort to maintain nationwide consistency, the Guidelines should be
the starting point.144  Then, “after giving both parties an opportunity to
argue for whatever sentence they deem appropriate, the district judge
should then consider all of the section 3553(a) factors to determine
whether they support the sentence requested by a party.”145  In so doing,
the court “must make an individualized assessment based on the facts
presented.”146  If the sentence is outside the Guidelines range, the court
must “ensure that the justification is sufficiently compelling to support the
degree of the variance.”147  Finally, the judge “must adequately explain
the chosen sentence to allow for meaningful appellate review and to pro-
mote the perception of fair sentencing.”148
136. 552 U.S. 38 (2007).
137. 552 U.S. 85 (2007).
138. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 41.
139. See id.
140. See id. at 42.
141. See id. at 43.
142. Id. at 45 (internal quotation marks omitted).
143. See id. at 47.
144. See id. at 49.
145. Id. at 49–50.
146. Id. at 50.
147. Id.
148. Id.
17
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The Court then turned to the nature of appellate review and held
that courts of appeals must review the sentence under an abuse-of-discre-
tion standard.149  First, the reviewing court must ensure that the district
court committed no significant procedural error, such as failing to calcu-
late the Guidelines range or failing to consider the section 3553(a) factors.
The appellate court must also “consider the substantive reasonableness of
the sentence imposed under an abuse-of-discretion standard.”150
When conducting this review, the court . . . will take into account
the totality of the circumstances, including the extent of any vari-
ance from the Guidelines range.  If the sentence is within the
Guidelines range, the appellate court may, but is not required to,
apply a presumption of reasonableness.  But if the sentence is
outside the Guidelines range, the court may not apply a pre-
sumption of unreasonableness.  It may consider the extent of the
deviation, but must give due deference to the district court’s de-
cision that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the extent of
the variance.151
In Kimbrough, decided the same day as Gall, the Supreme Court ad-
dressed the situation in which it was the Guidelines themselves, rather
than the exceptional conduct of the defendant, that were the basis of a
sentence below the Guidelines range.  Kimbrough had pleaded guilty to
various drug-related charges, including possession with intent to distribute
crack cocaine.152  Under the Guidelines, Kimbrough’s sentencing range
was 228 to 270 months.153  The district court determined that a sentence
in this range “would have been greater than necessary to accomplish the
purposes of sentencing set forth in [section] 3553(a).”154  The court also
commented that the case “exemplified the disproportionate and unjust
effect that crack cocaine guidelines have in sentencing.”155  The court sen-
tenced Kimbrough to 180 months in prison.156  The Fourth Circuit va-
cated the sentence, holding that a sentence imposed “outside the
guidelines range is per se unreasonable when it is based on a disagree-
ment with the sentencing disparity for crack and powder cocaine of-
fenses.”157  The Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit and held that
as long as the sentencing judge follows the requirements of Gall (i.e.,
149. See id. at 51.
150. Id.
151. Id. (citation omitted).
152. See Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 91 (2007).
153. See id. at 92.
154. Id. at 92–93 (internal quotation marks omitted).
155. Id. at 93 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Kimbrough would have
received a Guidelines range of 97 to 106 months had he been sentenced for an
equivalent amount of powder cocaine. See id.
156. See id.
157. United States v. Kimbrough, 174 F. App’x 798, 799 (4th Cir. 2006) (per
curiam).
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there was no procedural error and the sentence was substantively reasona-
ble) a sentence outside the Guidelines range, even if based on a disagree-
ment with the Guidelines themselves, is not reversible error.158
Finally, in Spears v. United States,159 the sentencing judge disagreed
with the powder-to-crack cocaine ratio of 100:1 set forth in the Guidelines
and sentenced the defendant using his own 20:1 ratio.160  The court of
appeals reversed, holding that while sentencing judges may disagree with
the Guidelines as applied, they cannot adopt their own categorical crack-
powder ratios in place of the Guidelines’ ratio.161  The Supreme Court
summarily reversed the decision of the Eighth Circuit and held that sen-
tencing courts are “entitled to reject and vary categorically from the crack-
cocaine Guidelines based on a policy disagreement with those
Guidelines.”162
D. The Application of the Guidelines Since Booker
Despite the Supreme Court’s efforts, or perhaps because of them, the
courts of appeals are still unclear as to the nature of the review of sentenc-
ing decisions.163  Part of this ambiguity is the lack of clarity in standards
like “abuse-of-discretion” and “substantively reasonable.”  However, this
uncertainty also stems from the confusion and lack of clarity at the Su-
preme Court level.164  This section will discuss some of the appellate cases
that illustrate this confusion.
In United States v. Tomko,165 the Third Circuit struggled to apply the
principles set out by the Supreme Court in determining whether the sen-
tencing judge abused his discretion in imposing a sentence with no term
of imprisonment in a tax evasion case.166  The stipulated tax deficiency in
Tomko was $228,557, which would have resulted in a Guidelines range of
twelve to eighteen months of incarceration.167  However, the district court
did not impose a term of imprisonment but instead sentenced Tomko to
250 hours of community service and three years of probation.168  The
158. See Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 110–11.
159. 555 U.S. 261 (2009).
160. See id. at 262.
161. See id. at 262–63.
162. Id. at 265–66.
163. See, e.g., United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455 (8th Cir. 2009) (en
banc); United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc); United
States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180 (2d Cir. 2008) (en banc).
164. See infra notes 260–68 and accompanying text.
165. 562 F.3d 558 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc).
166. The original panel decision in Tomko was issued on August 20, 2007. See
United States v. Tomko, 498 F.3d 157 (3d Cir. 2007), rev’d en banc, 562 F.3d 558
(3d Cir. 2009).  The en banc decision was not issued until April 17, 2009.  The
court of appeals, in a thirty-four page opinion, split eight to five on whether the
sentence should be upheld. See Tomko, 562 F.3d at 574–75.
167. See Tomko, 562 F.3d at 561.
168. See id. at 563.
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court imposed the lighter sentence because (1) Tomko had only a “negli-
gible criminal history;” (2) his company employed more than 300 people,
and Tomko’s incarceration would jeopardize their employment; and (3)
Tomko’s record of charitable works.169
On appeal, a divided en banc court agreed on the general standard to
be imposed.  Quoting extensively from Gall, both the majority and dissent
agreed that their review of the sentence should be in two stages.  First, the
court of appeals must ensure that the sentencing court committed no sig-
nificant procedural error, such as improperly calculating the Guidelines
range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the sec-
tion 3553(a) factors, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sen-
tence.170  Assuming there was no procedural error, the court of appeals
must then consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence, which
requires the court to look at the “totality of the circumstances” surround-
ing the sentence.171  Finally, the court of appeals should review both the
procedural and substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed for an
abuse of discretion.
However, the majority and dissent disagreed as to the degree of defer-
ence to be given.  The majority held that “if the district court’s sentence is
procedurally sound, we will affirm it unless no reasonable sentencing
court would have imposed the same sentence on that particular defendant
for the reasons the district court provided.”172  While the majority was
quick to point out that it did not necessarily agree with the sentence im-
posed, it was unwilling to disturb what it considered to be fact-bound in-
quiries that are better suited for a sentencing judge to make.173  The
majority thus confined its review to whether the sentencing judge consid-
ered the section 3553(a) factors, holding that “[t]he touchstone of ‘rea-
sonableness’ is whether the record as a whole reflects rational and
meaningful consideration of the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a).”174
In so doing, the majority seemed to reserve little for itself in the way
of substantive review.  Indeed, the majority’s “touchstone of reasonable-
ness”—and therefore its view of the substantive reasonableness of the sen-
tence—only examines the procedural soundness of the sentence: whether
169. See id. at 562–64.
170. Id. at 567 (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50 (2007)).
171. See id.
172. Id. at 568.
173. See id. at 560.  The majority noted “‘[t]he sentencing judge is in a supe-
rior position to find facts and judge their import under § 3553(a) in the individual
case.’” Id. at 561 (alteration in original) (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 51).  The ma-
jority also noted that, “ ‘district courts have an institutional advantage over appel-
late courts in making these sorts of determinations, especially as they see so many
more Guidelines sentences than appellate courts do.’” Id. at 566 (quoting Gall,
552 U.S. at 52).
174. Id. at 575 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Grier, 475
F.3d 556, 571 (3d Cir. 2007)).
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the record “reflects rational and meaningful consideration” of the section
3553(a) factors.175  Under the majority’s deferential approach to appellate
review, it is unclear under what circumstances the court would find a pro-
cedurally sound sentence substantively unreasonable.
The dissent undertook a more substantive review of the sentence im-
posed and the reasons given for the sentence.  Purporting to use the same
abuse-of-discretion standard of review as the majority, the dissent ex-
amined the reasons articulated by the sentencing judge for imposing a
sentence well below the Guidelines range.  The dissent also found support
in the opinions of other courts of appeals and argued that even though it
will give due deference to the district court’s decision that the section
3553(a) factors justify the extent of the variance, a reviewing court may
nevertheless “find that a district court has abused its considerable discre-
tion if it has weighed the factors in a manner that demonstrably yields an
unreasonable sentence.”176
In analyzing the factors the sentencing court relied on in imposing
the sentence, the dissent opined that a negligible criminal history did not
support the variance “because Tomko’s status as a ‘first-time offender’
[did] not differentiate him from many, if not most, tax evaders.”177  Like-
wise, the dissent found that Tomko’s employment record failed to distin-
guish him from other tax evaders.  Many white-collar criminals run
successful businesses, hence the desire to evade taxes.  The dissent be-
lieved that the prospect of the business failing should not be considered as
a mitigating factor, particularly “when the business itself was the vehicle
through which the defendant perpetrated the crime.”178  Finally, while
the dissent acknowledged that Tomko’s charitable works, however well-
timed, might justify some downward variance, they were not sufficient to
support the degree of variance in this case.  Thus, according to the dis-
sent, only one out of the three reasons offered by the sentencing judge for
the extraordinary variance justified a downward variance.179
In addition, the dissent noted that the “mitigating” circumstances re-
lied upon by the sentencing court only addressed one of the section
3553(a) factors, and the judge failed to emphasize other factors, including
the nature, circumstances, and seriousness of the offense.180  The dissent
noted that Tomko did much more than just fail to report income.  Rather,
he developed a sophisticated plan to evade taxes that spanned several
175. Id. (quoting Grier, 475 F.3d at 571).
176. Id. at 578–79 (Fisher, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Pugh, 515
F.3d 1179, 1191 (11th Cir. 2008)); see also United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180,
191 (2d Cir. 2008) (en banc); United States v. Taylor, 532 F.3d 68, 69–70 (1st Cir.
2008); United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 265 (4th Cir. 2008).
177. Tomko, 562 F.3d at 583 (Fisher, J., dissenting) (citing United States v.
Goff, 501 F.3d 250, 261 (3d Cir. 2007)).
178. Id. at 584 (citing United States v. Reilly, 33 F.3d 1396, 1424 (3d Cir.
1994); United States v. Sharapan, 13 F.3d 781, 785 (3d Cir. 1994)).
179. See id. at 585.
180. See id. at 585–86.
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years and required planning, coordination, and coercion of numerous
subcontractors.  The dissent thus determined that not only did the sen-
tencing judge’s justifications for imposing Tomko’s sentence fail to differ-
entiate him from other tax evaders, but also “the severity of his offense
and the extent of his culpability, as evidenced by the willful and brazen
nature of his conduct, remove Tomko’s tax evasion from the garden vari-
ety type.”181  Finally, the dissent noted the “perverse irony” of sentencing
Tomko to “home confinement in the very mansion that was built through
the fraudulent tax evasion scheme at issue . . . [a] house on approximately
eight acres, with a home theater, an outdoor pool and sauna, a full bar,
$1,843,500 in household furnishings, and $81,000 in fine art.”182
In United States v. Cavera,183 the defendant pled guilty to a firearms
trafficking offense.  The district court sentenced him to a longer sentence
than was called for by the Guidelines, “simply because [it thought] the
sentencing guidelines may understate the seriousness of this offense be-
cause of the consequences for the community of bringing or transport-
ing . . . firearms into New York City.”184  A divided en banc Second Circuit
wrestled with the question of whether the district court’s use of informa-
tion that did not pertain to the individual defendant, but only to perceived
geographical and sociological differences, was reasonable.185  The major-
ity noted that, after Kimbrough, a sentencing judge “may vary from the
Guidelines range based solely on a policy disagreement with the Guide-
lines . . . .”186  The majority held that it would not substitute its own judg-
ment for the district court’s on the question of what is sufficient to meet
the section 3553(a) factors and that it will “set aside a district court’s sub-
stantive determination only in exceptional cases where the trial court’s de-
cision ‘cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions.’”187
One of the dissents argued that “[w]here a district court’s sociological
and statistical findings, as to which it enjoys no special comparative advan-
tage vis-a-vis the Sentencing Commission, do not reasonably follow from
the evidence it cites, the court exceeds its allowable discretion and the
sentence is unreasonable.”188  Judge, now Justice, Sotomayor, in her own
dissenting opinion, decried the:
181. Id. at 586.
182. Id. at 587.
183. 550 F.3d 180 (2d Cir. 2008) (en banc).
184. Id. at 185 (second alteration in original).
185. Cavera contained a majority opinion, two concurring opinions, two opin-
ions that concurred in part and dissented in part, and one dissenting opinion. See
id.
186. Id. at 191.
187. Id. at 189 (quoting United States v. Rigas, 490 F.3d 208, 238 (2d Cir.
2007)).
188. Id. at 212 (Straub, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citation
omitted).
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[M]ajority’s excessive deference to the district court’s decision,
which risks a regression of the sentencing process to the “greatest
deficiencies of the pre-Guidelines regime,” namely “its failure to
provide for review of the decisions of sentencing judges and its
failure to ensure that the sentencing judge’s exercise of discre-
tion was informed by authoritative criteria and principles.”189
She warned that “[a]ppellate courts must not abdicate their responsibility
to ensure that sentences are based on sound judgment, lest we return to
the ‘shameful’ lack of parity, which the Guidelines sought to remedy.”190
In United States v. Feemster,191 a divided en banc Eighth Circuit ad-
dressed the scope of its appellate review.192  After remanding the sentence
twice, the court reviewed a drug sentence for a third time.  The sole issue
was whether the district court had adequately explained the basis for a
reduction from a 360 month Guidelines sentence to 120 months.  The
majority held that the judge’s explanations were sufficient.193  The dissent
disagreed, and asserted that the majority’s review was essentially:
[A] standard of no appellate review at all.  We adopt a posture
today that is so deferential that, so long as the district court gives
lip service and a bit of discussion to the relevant 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) factors, a sentence will almost never be reversed, pro-
cedurally or otherwise.194
There are other cases that struggle with the standard of review after
Gall.195  What is significant about these cases is that, despite numerous
attempts, the Supreme Court has failed to articulate a workable standard
of review.  If panels of courts of appeals cannot even agree on what the
standard of review is, or how it is to be applied, sentencing judges will be
further at-sea in discerning the amount of discretion they have in impos-
ing sentences.  Also, the majority of courts appear to be granting almost
unlimited discretion to sentencing judges, which is contrary to the intent
of Congress in the SRA and ignores the problems of the past.
With more discretion came more variance from the Guidelines:
189. Id. at 217 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(quoting Kate Stith & Jose A. Cabranes, Judging Under the Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1247, 1253–54 (1997)).
190. Id. at 224 (citing S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 65 (1983), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3248).
191. 572 F.3d 455 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc).
192. Feemster contains a majority opinion, two concurring opinions, and one
dissenting opinion. See id.
193. See id. at 463–64.
194. Id. at 471 (Beam, J., dissenting).
195. See, e.g., United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984 (9th Cir. 2008); United
States v. Smart, 518 F.3d 800 (10th Cir. 2008); United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179
(11th Cir. 2008).
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PERCENTAGE OF CASES SENTENCED WITHIN GUIDELINES196
Year Total Tax Fraud Drugs197 Year Total Tax Fraud Drugs
1998 66.3 75.4 75.5 95.9 2006 61.7 54.7 64.4 93.2
1999 64.9 74.1 72.3 93.8 2007 60.8 47.5 64.6 90.9
2000 64.5 71.2 68.6 93.0 2008 59.4 44.1 61.9 89.6
2001 64.1 66.2 70.7 92.9 2009 56.8 37.7 58.5 90.0
2002 65.0 63.2 71.2 95.2 2010 55.0 35.5 55.5 94.9
2003 69.4 62.6 74.8 88.8 2011 54.5 37.4 54.6 94.9
2004 72.1 69.3 76.0 95.8 2012 52.4 36.9 50.4 97.4
2005 70.9 71.6 75.7 91.4
As this chart shows, while the overall sentences within the applicable
Guidelines range declined, the tax sentences within the Guidelines de-
clined much more dramatically.  The fact that more than sixty percent of
post-Booker sentences in tax cases now fall outside the Guidelines range
demonstrates that there is substantially more disparity in tax cases post-
Booker.198  The question then becomes whether this disparity is warranted,
which Congress presumably would support, or unwarranted, which the
SRA was enacted to prevent.199
Whether disparity in sentences is warranted cannot be answered in
the absolute.  Whether a difference in treatment of two offenders is war-
ranted will depend upon the individual facts of each case.  Indeed, it is the
failure to recognize this fundamental premise that caused the Guidelines,
in their obsessively rigid constraint of judges, to be unworkable.  If a judge
does not impose a Guidelines sentence, it does not mean that the sentence
is more just or more appropriate.  It only means that the judge imposed an
individualized sentence.  While an individualized sentence might, in the
abstract, be better than a cookie-cutter one, this would not be the case if
sentences were based on inappropriate criteria or the judge incorrectly
applied appropriate criteria.
IV. ENSURING A MORE JUST SENTENCE
In the past 100 years, the sentencing pendulum has swung from un-
fettered discretion and indeterminate sentencing, to detailed and
mandatory guidelines, and now to guidelines-with-discretion.  The new,
more balanced approach to sentencing appears to be an improvement,
196. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING
STATISTICS tbl.27 (1998–2012), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Research_and_
Statistics/Annual_Rep_and_Sourcebooks/Archives.cfm.
197. The “Drugs” columns refer to drugs-simple possession. See id.
198. Of course, the possibility remains that all tax sentences have been uni-
formly reduced and there is no disparity.  While data is not available to disprove
this possibility, it seems unlikely.
199. See Feinberg, supra note 41, at 295.
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and, indeed, many people believe that to be the case.200  However, the
current system is far from perfect.  As detailed above, despite nearly eight
years of Supreme Court and other appellate decisions on the scope of
appellate review, there is no consensus among the courts on this issue.  In
fact, there is often no agreement within many circuits.  Moreover, the post-
Booker system allows for a judge to disregard the Guidelines and substitute
the judge’s own penal philosophy for that of the Sentencing Commission.
Thus, the sentencing system we have now is less like H. L. A. Hart’s game
of cricket with an official scorer and is more like the game of “scorer’s
discretion.”201  There are rules, but only if the judge chooses to follow
them; and there is appellate review, which really only amounts to ensuring
that the judge purposefully followed—or ignored—the rules.
It is clear that the number of sentences outside the Guidelines has
increased significantly since Booker.202  Sentences imposed outside the
Guidelines may, in many cases, be a positive development.203  An exces-
sively rigid Guidelines system leads to its own kind of disparity, and some
have argued that the problem of disparity prior to the Guidelines was over-
blown in the first place.204  Nevertheless, the problems with the pre-Guide-
lines, “lawless” system described by Judge Frankel were real, and the
200. See, e.g., Baron-Evans & Stith, supra note 92, at 1633–34 (“The advisory
guidelines system has broad support: the vast majority of federal judges believe
that advisory guidelines achieve the purposes of sentencing better than any kind of
mandatory guidelines system or no guidelines at all, the Criminal Law Committee
of the Judicial Conference of the United States supports the advisory guidelines
system, prosecutors prefer advisory guidelines to other available options, and the
organized public and private defense bars support the advisory guidelines system.”
(footnotes omitted)).
201. See H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 141–47 (Penelope A. Bulloch &
Joseph Raz eds., 2d ed. 1994).  Hart analogizes the law and judges’ role in the law
to a game of cricket or baseball played first without, and then with, an official
scorer. See id.  The players can predict what the scorer’s ruling will be because they
know and have used the rules, and because the scorer will, in the vast majority of
the cases, follow the rules. See id. at 143–44.  Applying this analogy to law, judges
have considerably more discretion than official scorers in a game, but they never-
theless are bound by laws, constitutions, and rules. See id. at 145.  Hart warns that
these “standards could not indeed continue to exist unless most of the judges of
the time adhered to them, for their existence at any given time consists simply in
the acceptance and use of them as standards of correct adjudication.” Id.; see also
Scott A. Schumacher, MacNiven v. Westmoreland and Tax Advice: Using “Purposive
Textualism” to Deal with Tax Shelters and Promote Legitimate Tax Advice, 92 MARQ. L.
REV. 33, 72–73 (2008).
202. See supra note 196 and accompanying table.
203. See, e.g., Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007).
204. See United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 471 n.15 (8th Cir. 2009)
(Beam, J., dissenting) (“I firmly believe, based upon almost five years of experience
as a federal trial judge and the sentencing, pre-Guidelines, of at least 500 federal
felons, that the ‘disparity principle,’ advanced by advocates as the foundation and
bedrock underlying federal guideline sentencing, is an illusion, by at least half.
Virtually every individual presents a different picture to a careful and conscien-
tious sentencing judge.  As a result, alleged uniformity is often disparity, viewed
through a different prism.”).
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potential for abuse cannot be ignored.  As Professor Bowman noted,
“[s]hould the Booker system survive, the exercise of the added judicial dis-
cretion might secure better outcomes for some defendants, but it would
also inevitably create more interjudge and interdistrict disparity.”205
In order to form a more perfect sentencing system, the sentencing
regime should be modified to include three elements.  First, just like the
current system, there must be a set of guidelines that are the starting point
for every sentence.  Second, similar to the current system, judges should
be required to impose a sentence that is adapted to the individual of-
fender.  However, this individualized determination should not be left to
the unfettered and unguided discretion of the sentencing judge with only
the vague standards listed in section 3553.  Rather, each guidelines section
should contain matters that are relevant and pertinent to individualizing a
particular offender’s sentence.  Finally, in order to ensure that the sen-
tencing judge imposes the sentence correctly, the system must allow for
real, substantive appellate review.  Discretion assumes power, and power
presupposes abuse of that power, or at least the ability to do so.206  Thus,
while guidelines and a common starting point, as well as the ability to
deviate from those guidelines, are essential to a just system, real appellate
review is necessary to quell the inevitable abuse of discretion.  I will take
each of these three proposals in turn.
A. The Sentence Must Reflect the Culpability of the Offender
Both the problems with the sentencing regime and the problems with
the appellate standard of review stem from a lack of coherent philosophy
underlying sentencing.207  The philosophical bases upon which society
punishes wrongdoers have bedeviled philosophers, scholars, and judges
for centuries.208  While a full exploration of this subject is beyond the
scope of this Article, there are essentially five traditional theories for which
punishment may be imposed: deterrence, retribution, just deserts, rehabil-
205. Bowman, supra note 89, at 257.
206. See, e.g., Christine Mai-Due, Judge in Rape Case Criticized for Light Sentence,
Remarks About Victim, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 28, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/
2013/aug//nation/la-na-montana-judge-20130829 (imposing thirty-day sentence
on former high school teacher for raping fourteen year-old student who later com-
mitted suicide).  The judge stated that the victim was “older than her chronologi-
cal age,” and that she was “as much in control of the situation” as her teacher. Id.
207. These two sets of problems are, of course, interrelated.  It is because
there is no coherent and consistent view of sentencing that appellate courts strug-
gle with the nature and extent of appellate review.  Likewise, since there is no
consistent or coherent view of appellate review, sentencing courts struggle with the
amount of authority they have in sentencing.
208. See, e.g., Cesare Beccaria, On Crimes and Punishments, in THEORIES OF PUN-
ISHMENT 117 (Stanley E. Grupp ed., 1972); R.A. DUFF & STUART GREEN, PHILOSOPH-
ICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW (2011); H. L. A. HART, ESSAYS ON BENTHAM:
STUDIES IN JURISPRUDENCE AND POLITICAL THEORY (1982); PHILOSOPHY OF PUNISH-
MENT (Robert M. Baird & Stuart Rosenbaum eds., 1988); Matthew A. Pauley, The
Jurisprudence of Crime and Punishment from Plato to Hegel, 39 AM. J. JURIS. 97 (1994).
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itation, and incapacitation.209  Notably, and problematically, Congress did
not resolve the debate regarding which of the purposes of sentencing
should be primary.210  Indeed, Congress instructed the Sentencing Com-
mission and sentencing judges to consider each of these purposes in sen-
tencing.211  In order for a sentencing regime not to be all things to all
people (or all judges), there must be a coherent—and consistent—system
of sentencing.  Without a coherent system, disparity, both warranted and
unwarranted, is inevitable.212
1. Two Theories of Punishment, One Sentencing System
The five theories of punishment noted above can be divided into two
overarching theories: the utilitarian theory and the retributivist theory.
Utilitarians maintain that punishment is only justified if the benefits to
society outweigh the harm caused to the person punished.213  Utilitarians
therefore rely on deterrence, rehabilitation, and incapacitation to justify
punishment.214  Retributivists focus on the conduct of the offender in jus-
tifying punishment.  It is because that person did something wrong and
violated the law that the person is being punished.215  Thus, the theories
advanced by the retributivist are retribution and just deserts.
For many legal theorists, these two theories of punishment were irrec-
oncilable.216  However, more recently, John Rawls and H. L. A. Hart each
reconciled the utilitarian and retributivist theories into one coherent sen-
tencing structure.  In his influential work, Two Concepts of Rules, Rawls ar-
gued that in justifying punishment there are two questions: why do we
punish at all, and why do we punish this particular person?217  The utilita-
rian theory answers the first question, while the retributivist theory answers
the second.218  Rawls then asserts that each of these questions, as well as
their answers, is relevant at different times in the sentencing proceeding:
The answer, then, to the confusion engendered by the two views
of punishment is quite simple: one distinguishes two offices, that
209. ROBERT M. BAIRD & STUART E. ROSENBAUM, PHILOSOPHY OF PUNISHMENT
8–9 (1988).
210. This problem is not new to the SRA.  As Judge Frankel stated regarding
the pre-Guidelines state of the law, “Congress and state legislatures have failed
even to study and resolve the most basic of the questions affecting criminal penal-
ties, the questions of justification and purpose.” FRANKEL, supra note 7, at 7.
211. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012).
212. I realize that with politics being what it is, it is perhaps naı¨ve to think that
Congress and its multitude of members and viewpoints could ever articulate one
coherent view on anything, let alone on sentencing.  Indeed, as Frankel noted,
Congress is not a philosopher’s grove. FRANKEL, supra note 7, at 62.
213. BAIRD & ROSENBAUM, supra note 209, at 8.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Rawls, supra note 12, at 38–39.
218. Id.
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of the judge and that of the legislator, and one distinguishes
their different stations with respect to the system of rules which
make up the law; and then one notes that the different sorts of
considerations which would usually be offered as reasons for
what is done under the cover of these offices can be paired off
with the competing justifications of punishment.  One reconciles
the two views by the time-honored device of making them apply
to different situations.219
Hart espoused a similar theory.220  The Rawls and Hart model is the ideal
framework for the application of the Guidelines after Booker.  The general
focus of the Guidelines should be utilitarian, with deterrence, incapacita-
tion, and, to a certain extent, rehabilitation as the justifying principles.
Thus, in tax cases, the initial Guidelines determination should be based, as
is currently the case, on deterring others.  In this regard, the introductory
commentary to section 2T1.1 provides:
The criminal tax laws are designed to protect the public interest
in preserving the integrity of the nation’s tax system.  Criminal
tax prosecutions serve to punish the violator and promote re-
spect for the tax laws.  Because of the limited number of criminal
tax prosecutions relative to the estimated incidence of such viola-
tions, deterring others from violating the tax laws is a primary con-
sideration underlying these guidelines.  Recognition that the
sentence for a criminal tax case will be commensurate with the
gravity of the offense should act as a deterrent to would-be
violators.221
In its legislative capacity, the Sentencing Commission rightly focused on
deterrence as the primary justification for tax prosecutions.  Indeed, the
introductory commentary is a perfect answer to the question of why we
prosecute tax evaders.
But “tax loss calculations,” “preserving the integrity of the tax system,”
and “deterrence” do not fully justify why we punish a particular tax evader,
nor should a sentencing judge be bound by the rough-and-ready tax loss
calculation.222  The answer to why we punish a particular defendant re-
quires the judge to focus on the retributivist justifications.  This is particu-
219. Id. at 39–40.
220. See Hart, supra note 12, at 16.
221. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2T1.1, introductory cmt. (2012)
(emphasis added).
222. See Rawls, supra note 12, at 38–39; see also United States v. Cavera, 550
F.3d 180, 192 (2d Cir. 2008) (en banc) (noting that many Guidelines sentences,
including tax offenses, drastically vary based only on amount of money involved).
However, “a district court may find that even after giving weight to the large or
small financial impact, there is a wide variety of culpability amongst defendants
and, as a result, impose different sentences based on the factors identified in
§ 3553(a).” Id.
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larly appropriate in tax cases, where often the sole difference between
legal tax avoidance and illegal tax evasion is the mental state (i.e., the
culpability) of the defendant.223
An example of this application is the case of Mary Estelle Curran.224
Curran was prosecuted for failing to disclose Swiss bank accounts that she
had inherited from her husband, which held as much as $43 million.225
Curran had hired a lawyer to disclose the accounts, but the lawyer did not
file the proper paperwork until after the government already had her
name from the bank.226  Under the section 2T1.1 calculation, Curran
faced a sentence of thirty to thirty-seven months.  However, the defense
presented evidence that Curran was a seventy-nine year-old widow, she was
financially unsophisticated, and that she relied on her attorneys and her
deceased husband regarding the tax treatment of this account.227  Deem-
ing the prosecution a “tragic situation,” the district court judge sentenced
Curran to one year of probation, but then immediately revoked it, effec-
tively sentencing her to probation for less than a minute.228  Thus, the
judge relied on both Curran’s lack of culpability and her age in dramati-
cally lowering her sentence below the suggested Guidelines range.
By the same token, some tax evaders may be more culpable than their
tax loss score would indicate and should therefore receive a harsher sen-
tence.  A noteworthy example of this situation is United States v. Ciccolini.229
Ciccolini embezzled $1,038,680 from a charitable organization of which
he was the director.230  Not only did he embezzle funds from a charity, he
structured the deposits of the embezzled funds by making 139 separate
deposits of less than $10,000 each.231  He also filed false tax returns for
multiple years and underreported his tax liabilities by $292,136.232  Thus,
this is a case in which the individual was more culpable than the garden-
variety tax evader.  The judge appeared to recognize this understanding.
The Presentence Report recommended a total offense level of fifteen,
with a range of eighteen to twenty-four months.  However, the district
223. See, e.g., Scott A. Schumacher, Magnifying Deterrence by Prosecuting Profes-
sionals, 89 IND. L.J. 511 (2014).
224. See Susannah Nesmith & David Voreacos, Widow Gets Less than Minute of
Probation in U.S. Tax Case, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 25, 2013, 12:01 AM), http://
www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-04-25/widow-gets-less-than-minute-of-probation-
in-u-s-tax-case.html.
225. See id.
226. See id.
227. See Defendant’s Sentencing Memorandum in Support of a Sentence of
Probation at 2–3, United States v. Curran, 9:12-cr-80206-KLR (S.D. Fla. Mar. 19,
2013), available at http://media.journalofaccountancy.com/JOA/Docs/
Curran_brief.pdf.
228. See Nesmith & Voreacos, supra note 224.
229. 491 F. App’x 529 (6th Cir. 2012).
230. See id. at 530–31.
231. See id. at 531.  Ciccolini made deposits in this manner to avoid certain
currency reporting requirements. See id.
232. See id.
29
Schumacher: Sentencing in Tax Cases After Booker: Striking the Right Balance
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2014
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\59-3\VLR305.txt unknown Seq: 30 14-AUG-14 14:56
592 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59: p. 563
court found that Ciccolini had testified falsely during his plea colloquy,
and the court found that the source of funds for both the structuring and
tax counts were the proceeds of illegal activity.233  As a result, the judge
determined a total offense level of twenty-six, with a range of sixty-three to
seventy-eight months.234  Notably, while the judge appeared to correctly
determine the defendant’s Guidelines score, he did not vary above the
Guidelines range based upon the defendant’s abhorrent behavior, per-
haps believing that the Guidelines sentence was appropriate.  But in fash-
ioning the individualized sentence, the judge did not determine the
sentence based upon Ciccolini’s culpability.235  Rather, the judge relied
on the writings of a “Nobel-winning economist,” who argued that in finan-
cial crimes, “incarceration is less important than providing a disincentive
to others and that the disincentive can sometimes be obtained through
financial penalties.”236  The judge imposed a sentence of one day of incar-
ceration, followed by three years of supervised release, and he ordered
restitution of $3,500,000.237
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit determined that the judge had no au-
thority to order restitution and reversed the entire sentence, because
sentences are “a package of sanctions” and the restitution portion of the
sentence was the means by which the judge sanctioned the seriousness of
the defendant’s conduct.238  Significantly, the court of appeals did not re-
monstrate the sentencing judge for employing a penal philosophy so at
odds with the Guidelines.
2. Institutionalizing Individuality
Following Booker, sentencing courts, after they calculate the Guide-
lines range, are required to consider the section 3553(a) factors and
“make an individualized assessment based on the facts presented.”239  As
indicated, the section 3553(a) factors include “the nature and circum-
stances of the offense,” the need for the sentence imposed to “reflect the
seriousness of the offense,” the need “to afford adequate deterrence,” and
the need “to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant.”240
Of course, many of these factors were already considered by the Sentenc-
ing Commission in fashioning the Guidelines range.241  More signifi-
cantly, some of these factors have nothing whatsoever to do with the
233. See id.
234. See id.
235. See id. at 531–32.
236. Id. at 531.
237. See id. at 532.
238. Id. at 534 (quoting Pepper v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1229, 1251
(2011)).
239. United States v. Gall, 552 U.S. 38, 50 (2007).
240. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)–(2) (2012).
241. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(c)–(d) (2012).
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individual facts of a given case.242  Thus, it is relevant to the individual
sentence that Gall abandoned the drug conspiracy and turned his life
around well prior to his conviction.  However, it is irrelevant for purposes
of imposing an individualized sentence that the judge in Kimbrough be-
lieved the crack-powder cocaine ratio was unjust.  That judge would pre-
sumably reach the same sentence in every crack cocaine prosecution and
not just in the case of Kimbrough.243  Likewise, it is relevant for purposes
of imposing an individualized sentence that Curran was elderly and unso-
phisticated.  However, it is irrelevant for imposing an individualized sen-
tence that the judge in Ciccolini believes deterrence in white collar crime
cases is best served by imposing a large fine in lieu of imprisonment.  Yet,
the current system allows judges to make these so-called individualized de-
terminations that are not based on factors unique to the individual case at
all.
In order for a sentence to be properly individualized, section 3553
should be amended to limit the factors that judges may consider in varying
or departing from the Guidelines.  Those factors should include the par-
ticular facts of the defendant’s personal, family, and business situation
and, significantly, should focus on the relative culpability of the defen-
dant.  The impact of the personal circumstances of the defendant, includ-
ing family situation; physical condition or impairment, and age;
charitable, public, or military service; diminished capacity, and mental or
emotional conditions; and post-offense rehabilitation, should be left to the
discretion of the sentencing judge.244  Likewise, sentencing judges should
also be permitted to vary from the Guidelines by relying on circumstances
that are unique to the defendant’s case but are not necessarily personal to
the individual, including whether the Guidelines sentence will have ad-
verse effects on employees or other innocent third-parties.245  These fac-
tors are routinely and appropriately used by courts in varying from the
Guidelines.246
242. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B) (instructing sentencing courts to con-
sider need for sentence to “afford adequate deterrence”).
243. Indeed, the Supreme Court appears to have accepted as a fact that the
sentencing court would have come to the same result in every case.  The Court
accepted this categorical rejection of the Guidelines because, in the Court’s view,
the crack-powder Guidelines were not the result of the considered judgment of the
Commission, but were the result of the requirements of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act
of 1986.
244. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2012 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING
STATISTICS, tbl. 25B [hereinafter SENTENCING COMM’N REPORT], available at http://
www.ussc.gov/Research_and_Statistics/Annual_Reports_and_Sourcebooks/2012/
Table25b.pdf.
245. See id. But see United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558 (3d Cir. 2009) (en
banc) (sentencing defendant well below Guidelines range).  The sentencing deci-
sion was made on grounds that the dissent, and I, believe are dubious; the sen-
tence was nevertheless affirmed.  Alas, no system will be perfect.
246. See SENTENCING COMM’N REPORT, supra note 244.
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However, the Guidelines should also be amended to provide more
structure for judges to base sentences more explicitly on the relative culpa-
bility of the individual defendant.  Section 3553 provides that the sentence
should “reflect the seriousness of the offense,”247 and section 994 instructs
the Sentencing Commission to fashion Guidelines that, inter alia, reflect
the “circumstances under which the offense was committed which mitigate
or aggravate the seriousness of the offense.”248  Yet, many of the Guide-
lines provisions focus primarily on the harm caused by the crime, but
largely ignore, or minimize, the defendant’s relative culpability.249
The tax Guidelines are a perfect example of this shortcoming.  The
Guidelines sentence under 2T1.1 is driven primarily by tax loss.  There is a
twelve-point difference between a tax loss of $2,000 and a loss of $200,000.
Yet, the Guidelines provide only a two-point increase for a sophisticated
means adjustment, the only specific offense characteristics adjustment that
is applicable in legal-source tax prosecutions.250  Moreover, this two-point
increase can be canceled out by an acceptance of responsibility adjust-
ment, making the defendant’s culpability and the manner in which the tax
loss was generated virtually irrelevant.  Similarly, the Guidelines for anti-
trust violations are driven almost exclusively by the volume of commerce
affected by the offense.251  Thus, these Guidelines focus almost exclusively
on the harm caused and largely ignore, or minimize, the relative culpabil-
ity of the individual defendant.
The Guidelines should allow for a finer-grained analysis of the defen-
dant’s culpability.  In this regard, the Department of Justice has proposed
an amendment to section 2T1.1 that would permit an upward departure
where “the offense level determined under this guideline substantially un-
derstates the seriousness of the offense.”252  As an example, the recom-
mendation cites a defendant who fails to disclose an offshore bank
account that has unreported income from the account that is relatively
small in comparison with the value of the assets hidden.253  Because of this
situation, the tax loss computation might understate the defendant’s true
culpability.254
247. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A).
248. 28 U.S.C. § 994(c)(2) (2012).
249. The Guidelines do allow for adjustments for the defendant’s “role in the
offense,” which increases the defendant’s sentence if the defendant was a manager
or leader. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.1 (2012).
250. See id. § 2T1.1(b).  There is an additional two-point increase if the in-
come that was underreported is derived from criminal activity, like narcotics sales.
See id.
251. See id. § 2R1.1.
252. Letter from Jonathan Wroblewski, Dir., Office of Policy and Legislation,
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to The Honorable Patti B. Saris, Chair, U.S. Sentencing
Comm’n 14 (July 11, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/foia/
docs/2013annual-letter-final-071113.pdf.
253. See id.
254. See id.
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While there is a good deal of merit to this proposal, assessing the
relative culpability of the defendant should not be relegated to a departure
from the Guidelines, as if considering the defendant’s culpability is an
extraordinary matter.  Rather, judges should be mandated to consider that
culpability in every case.  The fraud Guidelines, in section 2B1.1, might
provide a useful template for individualizing the Guidelines sentence
based on individual conduct and culpability of the defendant and not just
the monetary harm caused to the victim.  Courts could be instructed to
consider factors like whether the tax crime occurred over multiple years,
whether the conduct was more sophisticated than the limited two-point
enhancement would provide,255 whether the defendant was advised by a
professional,256 and whether the defendant was part of an illegal protest
movement.  Whatever is agreed upon as relevant for these purposes, the
focus should be on the culpability of the defendant that makes the defen-
dant’s conduct more serious or less serious than the Guidelines starting
point.
How is the system that I propose different from the post-Booker system
we currently enjoy?  Are sentencing judges not required to start with the
Guidelines and then consider things like “the seriousness of the offense,”
“just punishment,” and the defendant’s need for rehabilitation in impos-
ing their sentences?257  In a way, yes.  But judges are required to consider
all of the section 3553 factors, which include not only these retributivist
factors, but also deterrence, protecting the public, and promoting respect
for the law.258  Moreover, judges are given no guidance on which of these
factors they should choose from, and they are left to apply their own penal
philosophy in imposing their sentences.  Thus, a judge could rely solely on
deterrent theories in imposing the sentence, ignoring the retributivist fac-
tors.259  The system must ensure that the culpability of the individual of-
fender forms the basis of the individualized sentence, not the penal
philosophy of the individual judge.
255. Section 2T1.1 currently only allows for a two-point increase for sophisti-
cated means. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2T1.1(b) (2012).  Sophis-
ticated means is defined to include the use of an offshore account. See id.  But
there are many gradations of sophistication from the simple ownership of an off-
shore account that the defendant inherited, to the use of multiple layers of entities
to hide the defendant’s ownership of an offshore account.
256. Ordinarily, a defendant’s reliance on the advice of a professional is a
defense to the willfulness element of tax crimes. See TOWNSEND ET AL., supra note
85, at 175.  However, juries nevertheless find defendants guilty of tax crimes even
though they were advised that the conduct was acceptable. See, e.g., United States
v. Snipes, 611 F.3d 855, 859–60 (11th Cir. 2010).
257. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (2012).
258. See id.
259. See, e.g., United States v. Ciccolini, 491 F. App’x 529 (6th Cir. 2012).
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B. Sentences Should Be Subjected to Real and Substantive Appellate Review
In order to ensure that sentencing judges correctly apply the Guide-
lines and correctly impose the ultimate sentence on appropriately individ-
ualized factors, sentencing decisions must be subject to robust appellate
review.  Unfortunately, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence has left lower
courts with a confusing and inconsistent mandate.260  The standard of re-
view that the Court has articulated is “reasonableness” review.261  How-
ever, the Court, in explaining what the reasonable review entails, equates
reasonableness with abuse-of-discretion.262  But those two standards “are
not equivalent.”263  In addition, the Court allows, but does not require,
courts of appeals to employ a presumption of reasonableness when the
sentence is within the Guidelines range, but does not afford that same
presumption to sentences outside of the range.  Such a presumption is
contrary to the abuse-of-discretion standard the Court purports to use.264
Permitting but not requiring courts to use this presumption also creates
inter-circuit, and perhaps inter-panel, inconsistencies by allowing courts of
appeals to decide whether they will review a Guidelines sentence more
deferentially than one outside of the Guidelines.  Thus, abuse-of-discre-
tion review could mean different things in different cases, not a usual fea-
ture of appellate review.265
Moreover, under traditional abuse-of-discretion review, courts review
factual findings for clear error, while questions of law are reviewed de
novo.266  However, after Kimbrough, sentencing judges can disregard the
policies of the Guidelines and can develop their own sentencing regime—
their own law.  As Judge Posner stated, “[i]t is apparent from Kimbrough v.
United States, that the regime created by the Booker case, which demoted
the guidelines from mandatory to advisory status, permits a sentencing
judge to have his own penal philosophy at variance with that of the Sen-
tencing Commission.”267  But, developing an original penal philosophy at
variance with the Guidelines is a legal question, which ordinarily would be
subject to de novo review.268  Thus, courts of appeals are to engage in “rea-
sonableness” review, which is really abuse-of-discretion (although they are
260. See Carissa Byrne Hessick & F. Andrew Hessick, Appellate Review of Sentenc-
ing Decisions, 60 ALA. L. REV. 1, 13 (2008).
261. See id. at 9–10.
262. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46 (2007) (explaining Booker “made
it pellucidly clear that the familiar abuse-of-discretion standard of review now ap-
plies to appellate review of sentencing decisions”); Rita v. United States, 551 U.S.
338, 351 (2007) (“[A]ppellate ‘reasonableness’ review merely asks whether the
trial court abused its discretion . . . .”).
263. Hessick & Hessick, supra note 260, at 15.
264. Id. at 19.
265. See id. at 22.
266. Id. at 14, n.66.
267. United States v. Higdon, 531 F.3d 561, 562 (7th Cir. 2008) (citation
omitted).
268. See Hessick & Hessick, supra note 260, at 25.
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in fact two different standards), and the kind of abuse-of-discretion review
courts are to use bears little resemblance to traditional abuse-of-discretion
review.  The following section offers a better alternative.
1. Sentencing Decisions Should Be Subject to Traditional Abuse-of-Discretion
Review
Determining a sentence and entering a judgment and commitment
order involve the application of law to facts.  There is nothing about these
determinations that make them incapable of substantive appellate review.
In determining a sentence, judges make hard choices in reviewing evi-
dence and must make determinations regarding credibility.  But judges
make similar factual and credibility determinations in nearly every case.
Those decisions are not absolved from thorough appellate review.269
The Rawlsian system, combining utilitarian principles at the legislative
(or Commission) level with retributivist principles left to the trial judge, is
well-suited for traditional abuse-of-discretion review.  Under this system,
appellate courts would be tasked with reviewing whether the sentencing
judge correctly applied the objective, legal matters.  This would entail re-
viewing whether the sentencing judge correctly calculated the Guidelines
range and based the sentence on a correct application of the individual-
ized, retributivist factors.  Despite the holding in Kimbrough, sentencing
judges should not be permitted, as Judge Posner explained, to develop
their “own penal philosophy at variance with that of the Sentencing Commis-
sion.”270  The Guidelines, to the extent they employ utilitarian principles,
must be the starting point.  To permit otherwise is simply to instill a lawless
system.
In order to prevent the abuses of the past, there should be a uniform
starting point, and then an individualized sentence, to take into account
the facts of the individual defendant’s case, not the sentencing philosophy
of the individual sentencing judge.  Appellate courts would then review for
clear error whether the facts on which the judge based the individualized
sentence support the sentence imposed.  Using traditional abuse-of-discre-
tion review, where questions of law are reviewed de novo and findings of
fact are reviewed for clear error, would allow for the required uniformity
and individualization.
V. CONCLUSION
Imposing a criminal sentence on an offender is, or at least should be,
one of the most momentous tasks a judge undertakes.  Being sentenced to
a term in prison is undoubtedly the most momentous legal judgment an
individual will endure.  Subjecting these sentences to clear and identifi-
able legal rules and procedures that allow for both uniformity and individ-
269. See STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENCES, supra note
19, at 5.
270. Higdon, 531 F.3d at 562.
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ualization, where appropriate, is essential to a just system.  We have
centuries of experience on which to draw in crafting a sentencing regime.
More recently, the SRA was enacted in response to real problems and real
abuses in a system of unfettered discretion.  Less-fettered discretion is only
less bad if used appropriately,271 particularly when it is paired with a seem-
ingly unworkable standard of review.272  Policymakers should revisit the
SRA and craft revisions so that there is a consistent sentencing law that is
applicable to every case.  Judges should not be allowed to devise and de-
ploy their own penal system, which is in effect creating their own law.
Judges should be allowed to make appropriately individualized determina-
tions in each case, but only if the facts of the individual case make that
case different from the mine-run case contemplated by the Commission
and the Guidelines.  In this way, criminal defendants will be subject to the
same law as every other defendant, and criminal defendants will receive
the sentences they deserve.
271. See, e.g., United States v. Engle, 592 F.3d 495, 497–99 (4th Cir. 2010)
(sentencing defendant to eighteen months’ home detention with work release and
international travel privileges, despite having committed tax evasion over sixteen
years and having paid only $480 of $2 million in taxes owed during four year inter-
val between his guilty plea and sentencing).
272. I use the word “unworkable” because of the confusion the current stan-
dard of review appears to have engendered. See, e.g., United States v. Feemster,
572 F.3d 455 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc); United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558 (3d
Cir. 2009) (en banc); United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180 (2d Cir. 2008) (en
banc).
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